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Race, Reconciliation and Justice in Australia: From Denial to Acknowledgment 
Mark McMillan1 and Sophie Rigney2 
Abstract: The harm perpetrated by the state of Australia against it Indigenous peoples has been 
structured, prolonged, and driven by race. In this paper, we conceptualize this harm and how 
it has been denied (and particularly how race has affected this harm and its denial). Although 
transitional justice literature has not traditionally been applied to an established democracy 
like Australia, we demonstrate why it is appropriate to apply transitional justice practices to 
the relationship between the Australian state and Indigenous peoples, and what transitional 
justice practices might provide in the Australian case. In particular, we argue that a transitional 
justice framework may allow Indigenous voices to name the harm inflicted on them, and 
position the state as acknowledging the harm that they have perpetrated – bringing a 
fundamentally new relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples.  
Keywords: Indigenous Peoples, Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, Harm 
Since the arrival of the British to what is now Australia in 1788, a great deal of harm been 
perpetrated against Australia’s Indigenous peoples. Race has been a major driver of this harm: it has 
been used to justify the infliction of harm (for example, the removal of Indigenous children from their 
families on the basis of their race), and it has been used to structure the relationship between the 
Australian state and Indigenous peoples in a way that has allowed harm to be perpetrated (for 
example, the insertion of the Race power in the Australian Constitution in 1901). Not only has this 
harm occurred, but it has been repeatedly denied by the Australian state. In this article, we examine 
the infliction of harm and its denial by the state of Australia. We argue that the prolonged and 
structured violence perpetrated by the state against Indigenous peoples requires a transitional justice 
framework to facilitate healing. The existing transitional justice literature has only recently turned to 
the Australian context, in part because an established democracy like Australia has not been 
traditionally seen as a ‘paradigmatic’ case for transitional justice mechanisms. In order to establish 
why transitional justice might be appropriate in the Australian context, we commence this article by 
offering a novel understanding of how Australian political history has been constructed around the 
denial of racialized harm. We set out three key phases of the harm that has occurred, its denial, and 
its connection to race: Australia’s progression from colony to nation and its relationship with the 
colonizing power; Australia’s modern history of state institutions refusing to acknowledge the type 
and scale of harms; and the reconciliation movement as a political gesture rather than a healing move. 
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In the next part of the article, we examine why and how a transitional justice framework for Australia 
could permit greater realization of justice for Indigenous peoples. Numerous authors have pointed 
out the challenges of transitional justice in settler-colonial societies (see Nagy [2012], Henry [2015], 
Edmonds [2015]). We acknowledge these problems, but argue that transitional justice has several 
characteristics which might make it useful in the Australian context. Unlike the Australian 
reconciliation policy, transitional justice places the state properly at the centre of any question of 
redress, and allows race to have a place in the construction of what healing might look like. These 
aspects are integral to the idea that transitional justice might allow a more fulsome healing to occur. 
We further argue that, in order to avoid the possible problems of transitional justice, such a framework 
should have at least two features: it must be structured with Indigenous voices naming the harm they 
have survived and the healing that is appropriate, and it must involve a full acknowledgment of the 
harm by the Australian state. This paper therefore makes three contributions: it sets out a novel history 
of race relations in Australia and the way the Australian state has denied the harm inflicted on 
Indigenous peoples; it offers a suggestion as to why transitional justice might be appropriate in 
Australia; and it makes normative proposals for how transitional justice should operate in Australia.  
We write, together, as a form of a dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal 
scholars. We have written previously about the utility of our coming together in this way, to provide 
a viewpoint from both an Indigenous and non-Indigenous perspective (McMillan and Rigney, 2016). 
This article is an example of how we consider reconciliation dialogue can be optimally undertaken: 
with both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people talking openly, listening properly, and taking 
responsibility for their heritages and their current and future engagements. It is important for non-
Indigenous peoples to have solidarity with Indigenous justice claims against the state, and also to take 
responsibility for their roles and position in the ongoing violence of settler-colonialism. However, 
this article focuses on the relationship between Indigenous Australians and the state of Australia, as 
the entity that has been responsible for much harm and that should now be responsible for 
acknowledging that harm and being involved with healing mechanisms. 
Transitional Justice: A Framework For Understanding Race and Historic Injustices in 
Established Democracies? 
Transitional justice can be defined as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to achieve 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’ (United Nations, 2004). Applying transitional 
justice mechanisms in Australia – an established democracy with a Constitution and stable 
governance, which has not experienced declared war on its territory – may appear contentious. The 
‘transition’ of transitional justice has typically referred to one of two ‘paradigmatic’ cases: societies 
emerging from conflict, or moving from an old (authoritarian) regime to a new (democratic) one. 
Traditionally, transitional justice has been conceived of as involving a moment of rupture in a society 
(see Balint, Evans and McMillan [2014]). Transitional justice is ‘intimately tied with particular 
conceptions of democracy’ (Ní Aoláin and Campbell 2005, 173). Established democracies have not 
traditionally been seen as requiring the mechanisms of transitional justice.  
Yet democratic states can still perpetrate harm on a segment of their populations. As Ní Aoláin 
and Campbell point out, there can be cases of ‘conflicted democracies’, where there is ‘prolonged, 
structured, communal, political violence, even where the political structures could broadly be 
considered “democratic”’ (Ní Aoláin and Campbell 2005, 174). We argue that Australia is an example 
of a democratic state, whose white structures of governance have inflicted such ‘prolonged, 
structured, communal, political violence’ upon Indigenous Australians. A ‘conflicted democracy’ has 
both a ‘deep seated and sharp division in the body politic, whether on ethnic, racial, religious, class, 
or ideological grounds’, and actual or threatened ‘significant political violence’ (ibid, 176). We argue 
that both these conditions are met in the context of the Australian state and Indigenous Australians.  
In response to this acknowledgement that established democracies may inflict harm upon their 
population, there has been some recent work that has considered the utility of employing transitional 
justice mechanisms in established democracies (Winter 2014). As Winter notes, while cases of 
paradigmatic change ‘makes it easier to distinguish transitional justice institutions […] the context of 
established democracies requires more precision’ (Winter 2013, 231). In such a context, human rights 
violations might be considered ‘systemic’ (and therefore in need of a response) when such 
wrongdoing ‘is embedded in state policy’ (ibid). In these cases, state wrongdoing is not ‘deviant’ or 
in breach of the accepted standards, but rather ‘the regime of citizen-state relations is itself perverse’ 
(ibid). Winter’s analysis centers on the legitimacy of the state, and he argues that transitional justice 
can operate to ‘resolve the burden’ which rests upon the legitimacy of the state as a result of the 
state’s wrongdoing. In this article, we are less concerned with the state’s legitimacy, than with the 
ongoing relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, Winter’s work is 
important for conceptualizing the possibility of using transitional justice to ensure redress in cases of 
systemic harm committed by an established, democratic state. 
Recent literature applying transitional justice to the relationship of a settler-colonial state and 
an Indigenous population has primarily focused on the Canadian experience. This literature has 
emerged particularly from Canada’s recent Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (see Nagy [2012]; Nagy [2013]; James [2012]). Australia and Canada share many 
similarities: both are former British colonies and are now settler-colonies with an Indigenous 
population. However, there are also significant differences regarding how the state interacts with 
Indigenous peoples. In particular, Canada has both a treaty framework and a human rights framework 
to regulate this relationship, while Australia has neither of these. This difference is due, in part, to the 
different histories of Canada and Australia, and particularly their different historical relationships 
with Great Britain: the British entered into treaties with Indigenous peoples in Canada, but in 
Australia they invoked the doctrine of terra nullius, or ‘land belonging to no-one’. This allowed the 
British to claim the territory, as it was considered to exist without a state exercising sovereignty over 
it. The presence or absence of treaty and human rights frameworks is particularly relevant to state 
recognition of Indigenous people, their sovereignty, and the potential for the state to inflict harm. 
Treaties suggest a mutual recognition between the state and Indigenous peoples, and a human rights 
framework acknowledges that the state may wrongly engage in human rights violations against 
Indigenous people, and seeks to remedy any such violations. The absence of these two frameworks 
in Australia means that the relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples is profoundly 
different from the Canadian case.i For Australia’s Indigenous people, the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is the main vehicle to regulate the relationship between 
Indigenous people and the state (Davis 2008, 470), and in the absence of domestic provisions, 
Australia’s Indigenous peoples are compelled to use this international framework.ii In this way, the 
emerging transitional justice literature on Canada is helpful for the Australian context, but only in 
part. The Australian story is sufficiently different to require its own conceptualizations. However, the 
application of transitional justice to the relationship between the Australian state and Indigenous 
Australians is a new field of scholarship, emerging only very recently (Balint, Evans and McMillan 
[2014]; Henry [2015]). We seek to build upon this literature by reiterating the importance of black 
voices in building a transitional justice framework for Australia, and the importance of race in 
conversations of harm and healing. 
However, transitional justice can be undertaken in ways that can undermine Indigenous justice 
claims. With its emphasis on the state, transitional justice  can operate to silence or deny the justice 
claims of minorities and ‘peoples’ who make claims against the state. The emphasis of transitional 
justice on state-building has been matched with an ‘excessive individualism and false universalism, 
which may at times mask or obscure power relations within that discourse and which dominates ‘the 
imaginative space of emancipation’’ (Henry 2015, 207). This individualism has been reflected in the 
frequent focus of transitional justice on individual restoration, rather than on forms of Indigenous 
healing (Nagy 2012, 60), which tend to be more communal and political. In these ways, transitional 
justice is not always or necessarily able to bring improved justice outcomes for Indigenous peoples. 
These potential failures must be overcome. In this article, we suggest ways in which transitional 
justice might be structured, to overcome some of these issues. 
Identifying the Harm Done to Indigenous Populations in Australia 
In this section of this article, we outline the key moments of harm in the Australian context, 
and demonstrate the ongoing denial of harm that has occurred. This can be conceptualized as falling 
into three phases: first, the emergence of Australia as a nation-state and the denial of conflict (‘it is 
not us’); second, the unwillingness of the state to account for the type and scale of harm inflicted on 
Indigenous peoples (‘that which cannot be named’); and third, reconciliation as a political discourse 
rather than one of justice. At each point, we attempt to acknowledge the complexity of the Australian 
situation, with its multiple and overlapping spheres of responsibility for harm – in particular, the 
relationship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the state of 
Australia. We do this by tracking the shifts in the entity that perpetrated the harms against Indigenous 
peoples in Australia. These timelines are not clearly demarcated: they circle in and around each other, 
and together constitute a history of Australia’s race relations. 
In setting out the three phases of harm and its denial in Australia, we demonstrate how race 
has been utilized by white structures of state to perpetrate – and then deny – the harm. Race has been 
built into the institutions and apparatuses of the Australian state. It was not until 1967 that the 
Australian Constitution was amended to allow Indigenous people to be counted in the population of 
Australia, and as we explain below, race has been placed into the Australian Constitution. There have 
only ever been eight members of federal parliament who were or are Indigenous, and of that number, 
four are incumbent at the time of writing this article in 2017. It is these white institutions of state that 
have engaged in a steadfast denial of the conflicts with Indigenous Australians and the harm inflicted 
on them.  
1)  ‘It is not us’: the denial of conflict 
The territory now known as Australia has over two hundred separate Indigenous communities, 
who lived with the land prior to British arrival, and have never ceded their sovereignty of this land. 
From the start of British settlement in 1788, ‘prolonged, structured, communal, political violence’ 
has been inflicted on Indigenous Australians. This has included the use of force, armed hostilities, 
massacres, the removal of children, and dispossession of land (see Creative Spirits [2016]; Reynolds 
[2001]). However, the emergence of the Australian state independent from the colonial power, Great 
Britain, has obscured which entity must be accountable for past harms to Indigenous populations. At 
different points since the arrival of the British settlers, Australia has been a colonial outpost, a 
collection of colonies, a federation of states and territories, a dominion, and a member of the Realm 
of the Commonwealth with a British head of state. This multitude of political configurations, along 
with a complicated relationship with the colonial power, has permitted a space of plausible deniability 
for taking responsibility for the harms committed against Indigenous people. The state of Australia 
can deny their past responsibility, and at the same moment, Great Britain can deny any ongoing 
responsibility.  
Race has been critical to the formation of the Australian nation-state, and particularly the 
transition of Australia from colony to nation (Moreton-Robinson, 86-7). It was through ‘the 
intersection between race and property’ that the legal fiction of terra nullius was permitted to be 
invoked by the British Crown, in order to justify British settlement (ibid). Race, therefore, has always 
been integral to the encounters that have occurred between Indigenous peoples and settlers – and 
integral to the harms that have been inflicted on Indigenous peoples. The incorrect application of 
terra nullius permitted the acquisition of Indigenous lands for the British, and ensured that the 
Australian legal system was established upon incorrect assumptions about Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples. One justification for terra nullius was that Indigenous peoples were technically not people 
of sufficient evolution on a scale of civilization (Mabo v Queensland (No 2)), and therefore it was not 
possible to be in conflict with them. These incorrect assumptions continued for nearly two hundred 
years: it was only in 1992 that the doctrine of terra nullius was recognized by the Australian High 
Court as a legal fiction (Mabo v Queensland (No 2)). While this finding meant that there was no legal 
justification for the removal of land, by 1992 settler-colonialism was too advanced to fully return the 
lands to their traditional owners, and a complicated system of Native Title law emerged in Australia.  
This application of terra nullius was therefore integral to the claim made by the state of Australia, 
that it was not responsible for the harms done by the colonial state to the Indigenous peoples. 
Prior to the federation of Australia, the colonies retained the sovereign powers to deal with 
Aborigines. This structure was facilitated by Great Britain, which allowed these self-governing 
powers to the individual colonies. During the 1880s and 1890s, each colony implemented their own 
versions of apartheid legislation that sought to minimize or ‘breed’ out Aborigines – thereby using 
race to justify the infliction of harm (see, e.g. Aboriginal Protection Act 1869 (Vic)). The stated 
objective of the colonies in denying the Commonwealth the capacity to legislate for Aborigines was 
on the basis that it was their function to ‘smooth the pillow of the dying breed’ (Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity  Commission 1997). These policies were intended to ensure the demise of the 
Indigenous populations in Australia (ibid).  
During the negotiations between the colonies and Great Britain to create the federation of 
Australia in 1901, Aboriginal peoples were denied a place within the new federal entity. Instead, the 
‘race power’ was drafted to specifically ensure that the federation of Australia would be denied the 
capacity to legislate for Aborigines (Constitution of Australia, s 51 (xxvi)). The ‘race power’ 
originally read that the federal parliament possessed the ability to make laws with respect to ‘the 
people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to 
make special laws’ (ibid). Because of the structure of the Australian Constitution, which vests power 
in the states of Australia to make law in instances where there is no explicit federal power to do so, 
the capacity to legislate with respect to Aboriginal people remained with the states of Australia. In 
this way, race would be used to structure the relationship of the state to a segment of its population – 
its Indigenous peoples – so as to deny federal responsibility and vest that responsibility with the newly 
formed states. The ‘race power’ would subsequently be amended in 1967 to permit the federal 
government to draft ‘special laws’ for Indigenous people (see McMillan and Clark [2015]). However, 
this change served to further embed race into the Constitution of the state of Australia, and thus into 
how the state interacts with Indigenous peoples.      
Australia’s progression to nation-state was complex, and it is not obvious when Australia 
officially became a nation-state. Between 1901 and 1926 the Commonwealth of Australia was a 
federal framework for the states. In 1926 with the enactment of the Balfour Declarations, Australia 
became a dominion within the Empire. In 1931 the UK parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster, 
which declared the dominions to be ‘autonomous Communities within the British Empire,’ equal in 
status and ‘united one to another by a common allegiance to the Crown’ (Bennett 2004). In 1942, the 
Statute of Westminster was adopted by Australia and back-dated to 3 September 1939. However 
Australia was not legally independent from the UK until 1986, when the Australia Acts cut off any 
appeals from Australian courts to the Privy Council. Australian citizens were also British Subjects 
under Australian law until 1987 (Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984). Australia remains a 
member of the Realm of the Commonwealth, and today still retains the Monarch of the UK as the 
Australian Head of State. British involvement in the ‘internal’ affairs of Australia has continued. 
This relationship between the UK and Australia has meant that both entities can plausibly 
deny their involvement in, or responsibility for, the harms that were committed. White Australian 
institutions have been able to argue that it was the colonies and ultimately the colonial power that 
was responsible, while the UK rarely features in any discussion about Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
relationships in Australia, and is reticent to engage in any such conversations (Lawson 2014). As will 
be demonstrated in the next section, the Australian state has continued to actively deny the harms that 
occurred and their continued ramifications on Indigenous peoples today.  
2) That which cannot be named: the denial of genocide 
The space for denial that has been permitted by Australia’s complex history of nationhood 
and its relationship with the colonial power, has been opened further through a steadfast refusal to 
name the degree and type of harm inflicted. In particular, Australian institutions of state have refused 
to name the harm as genocide. Genocide – a term linked with state based or state sanctioned atrocities 
– has been debated ferociously in Australia since the 1970s (Tatz 2011). Under the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1949), ‘genocide’ is defined as undertaking 
particular acts, ‘with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such’. These acts include killing and ‘forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group’. However, it was Australia’s ratification of this Convention in 1949, which first forewarns of 
the difficulties of the concept to be applied in Australia. During the parliamentary debates at this time, 
several members of parliament stated that genocide as an ‘act of state’ would be unimaginable to 
occur or apply in the Australian context (see Tatz [2011], who makes reference to two 
parliamentarians speaking in the Commonwealth Parliament in 1949).  
Genocide has continued to be denied in the Australian context. Official mechanisms of state 
that have tried to raise the issue of genocide against the Indigenous populations have been 
discouraged. To the extent that such mechanisms have occurred at all, they have been piecemeal and 
limited. For example, legal proceedings and processes have been unwilling to describe any such 
instances of harm as genocide (see Kruger v Commonwealth). During the twentieth century, there 
were 118 government investigations into Indigenous Affairs (Tatz 1998, 2). Of these, the most 
‘powerful and critical’ investigation was the National Inquiry into the ‘Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families’ (Ibid). As will be demonstrated below, however, 
whilst this Inquiry might have been ‘the most critical’, it still failed to adequately name the harm done 
– and this failure actually further facilitated the space for denial.  
This Inquiry into the ‘Stolen Generations’ was established in 1995. The report of the Inquiry 
– entitled Bringing Them Home – was tabled in the Australian parliament in 1997 (Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission 1997). This report examined the question of whether the removals 
of children amounted to genocide, and found that the policy of forcible removal of Indigenous 
children ‘could properly be labelled ‘genocidal’ in breach of binding international law from at least 
11 December 1946’ (ibid, 239). This declaration is an important acknowledgement of the harm caused 
by policy and practice of removing children from their families. On first impression, this statement 
appears to recognize that this practice amounted to genocide. Certainly, this is how some scholars 
have read this statement (see Gunstone [2016]). However, the particular wording invoked – that the 
practice could be labelled genocidal, rather than is properly labelled genocidal – in fact leaves a large 
degree of uncertainty and equivocation. This softer language permits a space for some to contest the 
idea that this practice was genocidal. This framing of the genocide issue is further complicated and 
made particularly egregious because the original draft of the Bringing Them Home report is 
understood to have included a particular recommendation that genocide be a finding of the Inquiry. 
However, this recommendation did not appear in the final report (Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission 1997), and instead was replaced with this more ambiguous language. What 
remains is not a finding of genocide having occurred, or a finding that government policy in fact 
amounted to genocide. Instead, this is a finding that allows some to argue that the removal of children 
from their families was not genocide. Indeed, this is what then occurred, including at the highest 
levels of the state. By not articulating the harm unequivocally as genocide (but rather as ‘could be 
labelled ‘genocidal’’), Bringing Them Home actually facilitated this denial. 
Australia has actively been involved in ‘culture wars’ since the mid-1990s. The ‘culture wars’ 
has included debates about how history should be understood and taught, particularly the history of 
violence perpetrated against Indigenous peoples and whether this was genocide. Some historical 
accounts are being recast to genuinely reflect the magnitude of harms by the colonial apparatus 
against Indigenous peoples (see Reynolds [1982]; Ryan [2012], Curthoys and Docker [2001]). 
However, others have advocated a perspective that either denies or minimizes the harms. In particular, 
some have argued that the scale of harm has been exaggerated (see e.g. Windschuttle [2002]; 
Windschuttle [2009]). It is not only in academic argument that the harms have been denied or 
minimized: this has also been a hallmark of the Australian state institutions.  
One example of this use of scale to deny the harm done to Indigenous peoples was the claim 
by the Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs in 1996, that the Stolen Generations was not a 
‘generation’ at all – because only ten per cent of children that potentially could have been removed 
from their families, were in fact removed (Herron 2000). This statement ignores the fact that all 
Aboriginal children considered to be ‘half caste’ or ‘less’ could be removed. Playing with numbers 
cannot change the genocidal intention behind the removal of children, nor the effect that has had 
(inter-generationally) on all Indigenous people. Being Indigenous meant that you could be taken away 
from your family. Indigenous people have had to live with this, as their truth, from 1886. As a result, 
large numbers of people could not identify as Indigenous. The trauma of this continues today. That 
the Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs was able to engage so readily in this denial of harm – in 
his official capacity as the Minister responsible for interactions between Indigenous peoples and the 
state – demonstrates the connections between the state, and the active denial of harm and 
responsibility for harm done by the state to Indigenous peoples. 
The Bringing Them Home report made several recommendations that can be understood as 
further transitional justice mechanisms: apologies, the provision of reparations, and self-
determination. The report recommended that all Australian Parliaments ‘officially acknowledge’ 
previous ‘laws, policies and practices’ of removal, and that they ‘negotiate with the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission a form of words for official apologies’ (Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission 1997, recommendation 5a). From this, two things are particularly clear: 
first, that acknowledgement of harm is required, and second, that it is for Indigenous peoples to name 
the harm that occurred and the healing that is acceptable to them (as we discuss further, below). 
However, it was not for another decade that the federal Australian parliament undertook this apology. 
In the intervening years, Australia continued to deny the scale and type of harm – as well as denying 
Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty. Even more egregiously, this denial was conducted 
under the banner of ‘reconciliation’. The next section of this paper examines how the state of Australia 
has engaged in ‘reconciliation’ as a political discourse rather than a justice discourse.iii  
3) Reconciliation as a political discourse of private relationships  
To the degree that the Australian state has engaged in questions of harm and healing, it has 
done so through a model of ‘reconciliation’. This policy has lacked definitional clarity (see Short 
[2008], 39-41). However, the Australian government has defined reconciliation as being ‘about unity 
and respect between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and non-Indigenous Australians. It is 
about respect for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage and valuing justice and equity for 
all Australians’ (Australian Government, 2015). As a policy of the Australian government, 
‘reconciliation’ is forward-looking, does not adequately acknowledge the harms of the state, and does 
not allow the capacity for Indigenous peoples to seek justice through reconciliation post conflict. 
The reconciliation policy commenced in 1991, with the establishment of the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation (later Reconciliation Australia). The preamble for the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991, which established this Council, states that ‘to date, there has 
been no formal process of reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and other 
Australians’. As Henry points out, the Australian reconciliation movement is ‘premised on a vision 
of formal equality (‘equity for all Australians’) located within a restorative justice paradigm that seeks 
to unite all Australians. In this conceptualization, the state does not feature as a reconciling party but 
rather serves as the behind-the-scenes facilitator of reconciliation’ (Henry 2015, 204). The state 
supports reconciliation, rather than participating in it – this passive role allows the state to gain 
legitimacy, by making invisible the state’s role as the cause of harm to Indigenous people. 
Reconciliation is individualized and the emphasis is on private relationships, rather than on the state 
and how the state relates to communities that it has inflicted harm upon. Ultimately, the reconciliation 
policy has allowed a denial of the harms perpetrated by the state, and therefore has been used to 
‘bolster the legitimacy, authenticity and stability’ of the Australian state (Henry 2015). The 
reconciliation process is hence best understood as a stage in the colonial project rather than a genuine 
attempt at atonement (Short [2008]). In particular, the reconciliation policy has dismissed Indigenous 
claims to sovereignty and nationhood (see Short [2008]; Henry [2015]). This is a further reiteration 
of the denial of harm, as it does not permit a acknowledgment that cultures, ways of knowing law, 
and governance systems were attacked in the colonial process. It also reinforces white supremacy 
over territory, and ignores black understandings of the harm that was done, and what is required for 
healing. Reconciliation has been conducted on ‘white’ terms.  
The response to the Bringing Them Home report is a particular example of how 
‘reconciliation’ has been conducted as a politically controlled discourse, in a way that denied the 
justice sought by Indigenous peoples and that denied their sovereignty. Prior to the tabling of the 
Bringing Them Home report, a new conservative government headed by Prime Minister John Howard 
was elected in 1996. The Howard government rejected the recommendations for apology, reparations, 
and Indigenous rights on the basis that such actions ‘premised [reconciliation] solely on a sense of 
national guilt and shame’ (Howard 1997).  
In 1999, Howard made a Motion of Reconciliation to the federal parliament. In part, this 
motion stated that the parliament recognizes ‘the achievements of the Australian nation’ and that it 
‘recognises the importance of understanding the shared history of indigenous and non-indigenous 
Australians and the need to acknowledge openly the wrongs and injustices of Australia’s past’ 
(Howard 1999). It continued with the acknowledgement ‘that the mistreatment of many indigenous 
Australians over a significant period represents the most blemished chapter in our national history’ 
and that the parliament ‘expresses its deep and sincere regret that indigenous Australians suffered 
injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt and trauma that many indigenous 
people continue to feel as a consequence of those practices’ (ibid). Finally, it ends with the statement 
that parliament ‘believes that we, having achieved so much as a nation, can now move forward 
together for the benefit of all Australians’ (ibid). 
This Motion has been criticized for its expression of ‘regret’ rather than an apology. Further, 
the mention of ‘mistreatment’ in this motion significantly understates the harm inflicted on 
Indigenous peoples (see Gunstone [2016]) and is, clearly, a long way from an acknowledgement of 
genocide.  Although Howard consulted with the only Indigenous member of parliament at that time, 
there were a great number of Indigenous people who felt that this motion was deeply insufficient. 
Indigenous conceptions of harm and healing had not been prioritized. Finally, the emphasis of this 
motion on the nationhood of Australia and ‘the achievements of the Australian nation’ explicitly uses 
reconciliation as a nation-building exercise for the Australian state, further denying Indigenous 
sovereignties.  
In 2007, following the election of a new government, prime minister Kevin Rudd made a 
formal apology to the Stolen Generations, in federal parliament. The repeated invocation of the words 
‘we say sorry’ made this apology particularly powerful, and the apology was ‘generally well received 
by Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ (Gunstone 2016, 308). However, the Rudd apology again 
refused to acknowledge the practices of removing children as genocide. As Short has noted, in this 
sense ‘the apology failed to describe the harm inflicted accurately and in the terms favoured by many 
of the victims’ (Short 2012, 299).  
At the time of writing, in 2017, the recommendations from Bringing Them Home still have 
not been implemented in full. In particular, reparations have not been offered by the federal 
government; and the recommendations for ‘self-determination’ have not been implemented. The 
major political discourse in relation to Indigenous Australians and the state is focused on 
Constitutional amendment to ‘recognise’ Indigenous Australians in the Constitution. Unlike some 
state governments (in Victoria and South Australia), the federal government has no plans to enter into 
treaty negotiations with Indigenous communities. Meanwhile, attempts to ‘close the gap’ between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous wellbeing indicators have stalled: in 2017, it was announced that 
targets to improve life expectancy and reduce infant mortality rates for Indigenous Australians would 
not be met (The Guardian, 2017). In these ways, structural and political harms are continuing. 
The Possibility of Justice: Naming the Harm 
It is therefore clear that there has been a disavowal of the nature and type of harm in white 
Australian narratives and institutions of state, and also a disavowal of Indigenous conceptions of 
healing. Reconciliation, rather than being a mechanism for healing, has been employed by the state 
as a mechanism for the state’s legitimation - a form of ‘hijacking’ of supposedly healing mechanisms, 
for political motives (see Subotic [2009]). In this way, both harm and healing have been 
‘whitewashed’ in Australia. There is a disjuncture between, on the one hand, reconciliation as a 
project; and on the other hand, reconciliation as an attribute of transitional justice discourse and 
practice. 
Given the failures of the reconciliation movement, and the failures of state processes to 
adequately name the harm (let alone offer any redress), a more appropriate approach may be 
transitional justice. Henry has similarly argued that transitional justice is a ‘more useful conceptual 
framework to examine past historical injustices in established democracies’ (Henry 2015, 205). Henry 
has suggested a transitional justice model for Australia based on acknowledgement of harm, 
reparation ‘through innovative justice mechanisms’, and an acknowledgment of ‘differing and 
competing political perspectives of both injustice and justice’ (Ibid). 
As discussed above, transitional justice does have many potential problems. However, it is 
our argument that transitional justice has two particular characteristics that the reconciliation policy 
has not demonstrated: it centralises the role of the state, and it allows black voices to articulate the 
harm done and the healing that is possible. However, these are possibilities and not certainties for the 
use of transitional justice, and we therefore make the normative argument that these aspects be 
enforced in any transitional justice framework. Any such framework must be structured with 
Indigenous voices naming the harm they have survived, and must involve a full acknowledgment of 
the harm by the state. We now turn to these arguments. 
First, transitional justice brings an understanding of the state having perpetrated harms on a 
section of its population – and that the state that is responsible for the provision of redress. The state 
is therefore placed as a core entity in the infliction of harm and the responsibility for healing. As 
Henry points out, transitional justice ‘has the potential to draw critical attention to the role and harms 
of the state, rather than presenting it in either neutral or beneficial terms’ (Ibid). This is a key strength 
of applying transitional justice literature to established democracies, because such states might 
otherwise refuse to acknowledge the harm they have caused, or that they can be integral to ensuring 
healing. As we have shown, the reconciliation movement in Australia has been criticized because it 
minimized the role of the state as an active participant in the reconciliation process. Transitional 
justice, however, emphasizes the state and its responsibility – while at the same time, transitional 
justice permits the voices of victims to have an integral part in naming the harm and conceptualizing 
the healing. Although the state is highlighted, it is not the sole focus of transitional justice.  
Secondly, just as race has operated as a factor in the infliction of harm, race can also be central 
to practices of healing. In particular, race is an important aspect of why the reconciliation movement 
in Australia has been limited, and why transitional justice could be a more appropriate model for 
addressing historical and ongoing injustices inflicted on Indigenous peoples by the state. In particular, 
transitional justice may be able to centralize black voices in articulating the harm and healing, and 
thus to support Indigenous conceptions of justice. As Kieran McAvoy and Lorna McGregor have 
argued, communities must have input into transitional justice mechanisms appropriate for their 
community: this is transitional justice ‘from below’ (McAvoy and McGregor 2008). In the Australian 
context, we argue that community-driven transitional justice must center an Indigenous framing of 
harm and healing, with Indigenous communities setting out what type of redress they want – and 
from whom. The over two hundred separate Indigenous communities in Australia may have different 
experiences of harm, and different expectations of what constitutes healing. Understanding this 
multiplicity must be a first step in any transitional justice framework for Australia. There are, 
however, some apparent commonalities between Indigenous communities, and these form a useful 
place to start an examination of what transitional justice might look like. It follows from what we 
have set out above that it is necessary to have an act of acknowledgment of the responsibility for, and 
the scale of, the harm done. Acknowledgment is the opposite of the denial we have outlined above. 
Such denial has only served to further reinforce the harm: to refuse to acknowledge the stories of 
harm, or to minimize the scale of the harm, is fundamentally re-traumatizing. 
While both the Bringing Them Home report and the apology to the Stolen Generations can be 
understood as moments of transitional justice (see Henry [2015]; Balint, Evans and McMillan [2014]) 
and indeed as moments of acknowledgment of harm, these moments have been piecemeal and have 
not been undertaken as part of a transitional justice framework. They have not definitively named the 
violence as genocide. Moreover, they also both address just one aspect of violence – the removal of 
children from their families – while other violence has gone unacknowledged. Future transitional 
justice mechanisms should address the multiplicities of harm inflicted on Indigenous peoples, in a 
holistic manner. Such mechanisms should also consider the continued structural injustices inflicted 
by the settler-colonial state. Both the harms inflicted by Great Britain (and its colonies), and by the 
state of Australia, should be considered. This is not a small project, and if the history we have set out 
above is any guide, it may prove to be politically unpalatable to white Australia. Nonetheless, it is a 
crucial project if Australia is to account for its historical injustices.   
Arguably, the closest that Australia has come to such a moment of acknowledgment of the 
harm inflicted on Indigenous peoples was the then-Prime Minister Paul Keating’s ‘Redfern’ speech, 
which acknowledged: 
it begins, I think, with that act of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the 
dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We 
brought the diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from 
their mothers. We practiced discrimination and exclusion (Keating 1992).  
Keating was correct that healing must begin with a proper, complete act of recognition of 
harm and who was responsible for it. For this reason, the Redfern speech remains a powerful moment 
of and the Australian state, represented by the prime minister, acknowledging some responsibility for 
past injustices. However, this speech did not go as far as constituting an apology for that harm. 
Keating stated that he did not believe guilt was something that white Australia should feel (ibid). 
Further, the Redfern speech centered the state of Australia, rather than Indigenous sovereignties, with 
Keating’s assertion that Aboriginal Australians ‘helped build this nation’ (Ibid). Although the 
Redfern speech was an important moment of acknowledgment of harm, it is also an example of how 
this was done in a manner which did not engage with Indigenous wishes. This moment can be 
transcended.  
A transitional justice framework for Australia might include a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission with a mandate to address all the harm perpetrated against Indigenous Australians (not 
only the removal of children). This would rectify the problem that the National Inquiry into the Stolen 
Generations only focused on one aspect of harm, rather than the other complex patterns of violence 
that were committed as part of settler-colonialism, but that have never been fully investigated as part 
of a Commission of Inquiry. Further, full reparations for the Stolen Generations, and reparations for 
other forms of harm, should also be implemented. Finally, a new legal relationship between the state 
and Indigenous peoples, which recognizes the sovereignty of those peoples – a treaty – should be 
negotiated. In this way, transitional justice would be undertaken in a way that prioritises Indigenous 
sovereignties. This would be fundamentally different from the reconciliation policy, which denied 
Indigenous sovereignties. This, then, is a political implication of allowing black voices in the 
construction of healing, and of placing the state at the centre of questions of redress. However, all 
these mechanisms must be conceptualized and undertaken in a way that allows Indigenous peoples 
to name the healing processes that are most meaningful.  
Conclusion 
The Australian state has denied the harms committed against Indigenous peoples, and at the 
basis of this denial has been race. White Australian institutions of state have actively created a 
narrative that has denied responsibility for harm, and white Australian institutions of law and state 
have further reinforced this narrative through denying to name the harm done as genocide. Finally, 
reconciliation policies have been driven by white Australian institutions of politics, in order to bolster 
their own position and deny Indigenous understandings of harm, healing, and sovereignty. In light of 
all this, we call for a renewed framework, based in a transitional justice conceptual model, to better 
align Indigenous and non-Indigenous ways of relating.   
We have demonstrated that although transitional justice has not traditionally been associated 
with established democracies, increasingly it is understood that that transitional justice is necessary 
in states – including democracies – that have systemic wrongdoings embedded in state policy. This 
has been the case in settler-colonial states such as Australia, but the application of transitional justice 
to Australia is only now emerging. Without a treaty framework, the Australian story is different from 
that of other established democracies that have started to employ transitional justice frameworks for 
understanding the relationship between the settler-colonial state and Indigenous peoples. The 
Australian context necessitates its own examination of how transitional justice can be operationalized. 
In addition, the Australian state is now a party to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which – in the absence of a treaty with Indigenous peoples – is the main 
mechanism for Indigenous peoples to seek justice. This Declaration requires states to provide 
effective redress for acts of harm (article 8(2)). In light of this obligation in the Declaration – and the 
emergent scholarship that properly situates transitional justice within established democracies – now 
is an appropriate moment to use transitional justice frames to understand the relationship between 
white history and black sovereignty. As we have argued, in order to actually encourage improved 
justice outcomes for Indigenous Australians, a model of transitional justice for Australia must 
prioritize Indigenous understandings of harm and healing, in order to ensure that the state undertakes 
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i Similarly, in New Zealand a treaty governs the relationship between the state and Indigenous peoples. The 
literature on transitional justice in New Zealand (see Winter [2014]) is of some assistance, but not precisely 
on point for Australia. 
ii Other relevant international human rights documents include the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International 
Covenant on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. 
iii When we discuss a ‘political discourse’ as being problematic in this article, we are referring particularly to 
the way that the reconciliation policy of the Australian state has been undertaken in a political mode - 
involving the legitimizing of state behavior, rather than a mode of atonement. We do not mean to suggest 
that all politics are inherently negative; indeed, it is also a political act to engage in transitional justice.  
                                                 
